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BELGIUM AND THE COMMUNITY 
The price of progress is eternal effort, 
Because the narrow structure of Europe's 
national states has discouraged this effort t and set them at odds, Europe as a whole 
has fallen behind in the twentieth cent'.ll'y 
march of progress. It is to overcome this 
handicap that the European Coal and Steel 
Community, with its comnnn market covering 
a six-nation area, was formed as a first 
step to a united Europe. 
For Belgium's 8 million people, who have 
built up one of the world's highest standards 
of living and, proportionately, one of its 
biggest export trades, on coal, this· handicap 
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has loomed large. Today, their coal industry designed to make Belgium self-sufficient in coal but kept at 
its present size only by protection against imports, is much the most ext>ensive in Europe. It raises the cost 
of the very goods Belgium sells in order to live. 
Competition on the common market is already lowering the price of coal for Belgian consumers, nut 
the task of bringing Belgian coal into the common market without disruption and hardship for whole areas 
which live by mining it has presented a major problem. Special transitional measures were written into the 
Community treaty to make it possible for Belgium to join and to permit a gradual change in the structure 
of her coal industry. t An experts' study has just been published on the future prospects of four ~marginal" mining companies 
of the Borinage coalfield in southern Belgium, which are in difficulties, The following report, based on a 
visit to the Borinage, aims at illustrating the issues and problems raised by the transition from a national 
to a European market and the new opportunities for progress opened by European perspectives . 
BELGIAN COAL 
The common market has not created the 
problems of the Belgian coal industry and of 
the Borinage in particular. It has simply made 
acute, problems which had been accumulating 
for many years and were greatly worrying the 
Belgian authorities. 
In the national framework these problems 
seemed almost insoluble. For in a Europe t>f 
rival national states, each considering only its 
immediate self-interest, Belgium had to be 
self-sufficient. Only in this way could she be 
sure that she had sufficient power resources 
to guarantee peak production in her export in-
dustries during the boom periods when they 
made their profits. But to be self-sufficient it 
was necessary to work coalseams which would 
normally be regarded as uneconomic. It was 
necessary also to protect the mines working 
them in periods when supplies were ample and 
neighbouring countries eager to sell coal in 
Belgium. High-cost, protected Belgian coal 
became a classic example of the economic 
results of a system of rival nations where a 
full division of labour is made impossible. 
The Borinage is the most westerly of the 5 coal-
fields of Belgium (others: Centre, Charleroi, Liege, 
Campine). Its centre is Mons, near sites of several 
great battles of European history. 300 Flemish mi-
ners come every day by eoaeh to work in the pits 
belonging to the Charbonnages Beiges 4 some from 
Dixmuiden and Veurnes by the sea: 3 hours' drive 
each day. 
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The story of the borinage 
The Boi'inage coaldfield can in many ways be 
regarded as a victim of these conditions. Its 
history is explained by M. Andre Dupont, chief 
engineer attached to one of the seven mining 
companies in the coalfield. 
"Our mine goes back to the 17th century, 
when it was owned by the local seigneur for 
his own profit and the convenience of his 
tenants, At one time, it wa!? owned by the 
Knights Templars, the great crusading religious 
order and, later, in the 19th century by the 
great banking family of Rothschild in Paris. But 
it was a very small affair, only exploited when 
local demand required it and employing less than 
a dozen people, until 1840, when the canal from 
Mons to Conde, servicing the growing industry 
of northern F·rance, was opened, Industrialisa-
tion proper began only after 1870~ From then, 
and especially from 1890, a period of intense 
prosperity followed, until the outbreak of the 
first World War in 1914. • 
"Then came the beginning of decline for the 
Borinage. The richest veins had been worked, 
· and the irregularity of many of the remaining 
seams made mechanical extraction difficult - a 
great handicap in a period of growing mechani-
sation. But above all the problems were political 
and financial". 
And then M. Dupont told a story which 
M. Louis Dehasse, President of the Association 
of Belgian Coal Producers, had also outlined 
in different words. The gist of the story was 
that ever since 1914 one or another circum-
stance had prevented the normal development 
of the coalfield; and almost everyone of these 
circumstances was the result of national divi-
sions and rivalries. 
During the German occupation in the first 
World War the mines produced as little as they 
could and made few or no investments. 
Immediately after the war, the Belgian go-
vernmen.t found that the iron ore on which the 
steel industry depended could only be obtained 
from France in return for coal sold at unecono-
mically low prices. It was the Borinage mines 
which had to provide this coal. Today, this 
could not happen. French export quotas on iron-
ore were abolished when the common market 
was established and may not be reimposed. But 
Seams in Europe are by American standards thin and deep underground; the hardest to work in Europe are 
the Belgian and in Belgium those of the Borinage, Machinery visible in the top picture cannot be used in 
irregular seams which abound. Lower pictures: on the left, simplified cross-section of the irregdar seams 
worked by Charbonnages Beiges; centre, conditions of extraction at great depths often met in Europe; 
right, much more favourable American conditions; thick seams worked in hillsides. Useful comparisons 
between European and American output per man are therefore impossible in mining. 
in the early twenties the Borinage had to sell 
this coal in the national interest. 
Then German coal began to come in in large 
quantities at low prices as . reparations. Then, 
in 1926 the Belgian franc was devalued. Then, 
in 1929, ~he slump came. The mines of the 
Borinage kept in business by making low profits 
and foregoing most of their necessary . invest-
ment. ~ven then Belgian coal was only able to 
compete because · Belgian wages and living 
standards were low, lower than in France or 
Germany. 
This situation lasted until the second World 
War came to repeat for the mines the conditions 
of the first. This was followed in the immediate 
postwar penod by "the battle for coal• which 
permitted the exporting industries to forge 
ahead and the country to recover very quickly, 
Labour had become scarce and government 
policy was to raise living standards. Belgian 
wages became the highest in Europe. This 
raised costs. But prices were pegged. To keep 
the mines of the Borinage going it was necessa-
ry to institute subsidies. 
continued p. 6 
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THE WEEKS PAST 
October 23 
High Authority begins full- scale talks 
with representatives of GEORG (the 
agency controlling the sale of 115 million 
tons of Ruhr coal) and with German mi-
ners and consumers to discuss ways in 
which GEORG can be adapted to conform 
with the Community Treaty which forbids 
cartel pratices. Talks relating to ATIC, 
the French coal importing agency set up 
by French governmental decrees, and 
COBECHAR, the Belgian coal sales 
agency, are proceeding. 
October 25 
Leopold Figl, Austrian Foreign Minister 
and former Chancellor pays courtesy 
visit to the High Authority in Luxembourg. 
November 11 
Jean Monnet announces he will not seek 
re-election as President of the High 
Authority when his term of office ends 
on February 10, 1955. 
November 22 
Council of Ministers approves slightly 
modified text of AssociationAgreement 
submitted by the High Authority. 
M. Monnet given mandate by Counci I to 
negotiate the revised text with the British 
Government. M. · Ulver, French Trade 
Minister, who presided the Council, also 
asks M. Monnet, on his own behalf and 
on behalf of all other ministers present, 
to reconsider his decision not to stand 
for re-election, 
November 29 - December 2 
Common Assembly holds 4th extraordi-
nc:ry session in Strasbourg, approves a 
progress report by Jean Monnet and 
discusses cc:rtels, investments and 
Association with Britain. 
lt calls on M. Monnet to reconsider his 
decision not to stand for re- election and 
suggests procedure to be adopted for 
election of new President of the High 
Authority next Februc:ry. 
December 7 
Council of Ministers gives final approval 
of Association Agreement with Britain 
and asks High Authority to go to London 
to sign the Agreement with the British 
Government. 
EUROPE 
In Luxembourg last month, seven judges in 
dark-red robes filed into an improvised courtroom 
. . l 
removed their bonnets and faced the opposing 
lawyers of the case they had come to judge : Maitre 
Jean Coutard, in the black robes of the Paris Court 
of Appeal, for the defendant, and Professor Paul 
Reuter, resplendent in the scarlet and ermine gown 
of a French magistrate, who was bringing the case 
on behalf of the French Government. 
The case was a highly complex one, and pro-
bably not more than a small proportion of the large 
audience-diplomats, official observers, interna-
tional civil servants, reporters and sightseers. 
fully understood .the legal subtleties of the oppo-
sing arguments that were to follow. In fact, if these 
arguments alone were considered, the very pub I i-
city seemed out of place : the whirring of news· 
reel cameras, the press photographers, the cramm-
ed press gallery, the simultaneous translation of 
the proceedings into four languages- Belgian, 
French, German and Italian. Yet the atmosphere 
was one of expectation and excitement, as of a 
"cause celebre". And "cause celebre" it was · 
for the first time in history Europe was going t~ 
court, before a supra national Court of Justice whose 
decision was final and binding, from which there 
was no appeal. 
The proceedings in Luxembourg were not the 
same as at the International Court of The Hague, 
where natiorts may agree, over a particular issue, 
to submit to jurisdiction outside their own national 
courts. lt sprang from the signing, on April 15, 
1951, of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community for Coal and Steel, and its working 
institutions, including its independent judiciary, 
the High Court of Justice, 
TO COURT 
Any individual, enterprise or government of 
the member-states, the signatories of the Treaty, · 
(Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands) may appeal to the court, 
which is the sole authority to decide whether the 
decision of the Community's Executive, the High 
Authority, are to be upheld or quashed. lt is, in 
fact, an embryonic Supreme Court, interpreting the 
constitution- in this case, the Community Treaty 
and its regulations. 
The case before the High Court at the opening 
of its first public session arose out of the High 
Authority's revision, in January 1954, of its Fair 
Trading Code governing the publication of steel 
prices, The High Authority had allowed steel pro- . 
ducers to vary their prices by 2,5 % above and 
below their published prices wi'thout actually pu-
blishing the changes, The French Government, 
which was bringing the case, contended that this 
was contrary to the Treaty and made for discri· 
m inations by producers between their clients, 
Professor Reuter accused the High Authority of 
acting unconstitutional! y-contrary to the Treaty. 
High Author ity lawyers denied this and claimed the 
High Authority's system of investigation made it 
perfectly easy to spot and prevent discriminations, 
The case was followed by two more, brought 
on exactly the same issue, by the I tal ion Govern· 
ment and two Italian steel producers associations. 
In all the session lasted almost a fortnight. 
The Court wi 11 not announce its judgement 
for several weeks and the matter is still sub judice. 
But already observers have seen in this first 
session evidence that supranationality is, in the 
words of a newspaper article, "on the move". Three 
facts ore striking : the realisation that the High 
Authority, along with the member- countries of the 
Community, producers, consumers and individuals, 
is subject to the Court's ruling and not "above the 
law;" secondly, the tribute, by the French and lto-
1 ion Government counsel, to the High Authority 
itself, its principles, past achievements and inte-
grity, and their wholehearted acceptance of the 
Court's final verdict, whatever the outcome; thirdly, 
the fact that, probably for the first time in history, 
two Frenchmen, Moitre Jean Coutard and M. Michel 
Gaudet (a member of the High Authority's legal 
departement) were defending the point of view of a 
supranational organisation· the High Authority-
against their own country. 
The personality of the French Government 
counsel was itself an exemple of the way E uropeon 
institutions have moulded individuals. Professor 
Reuter is without doubt one of the worid' s foremost 
authorities on the Community. He served, with 
great distinction, on the French delegation to the 
conference which set op the Community; he had a 
large hand in drafting the Treaty, and has written 
a book about the Community. 
As M. Jean Monnet, President of the High 
Authority, told an American correspondent the day 
the session began : •whichever way the decision 
goes the prestige and cohesion of the entireCommu-
nity will be enhanced ... I think today's first public 
session is not only a landmark for the Community 
but for European history os well." 
THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE 
The Court of Justice exists •to ensure 
the rule of law ~n the interpretation and 
application of the Treaty and its implemen-
ting regulations ," 
No national court has jurisdiction in 
these matters. The court's judgements are 
directly binding on all parties, whether 
national governments or enterprises. 
Th,e Court may arbitrate in any dis-
pute between member states at their request. 
The Court is composed of seven 
judges, appointed for six years by the 
Council of Ministers. The judges designate 
one of their number as President for three 
years. 
Massimo Pilotti (Italian) President 
Petrus Serrarens (Dutch) President 
of first Chamber 
Charles Hammes (Luxemburger) Pre-
sident of second Chamber 
Otto Riese (German) 
Jacques Rueff (French) 
Louis Delvaux (Belgian) 
Adrianus V an Kleffens (Dutch) 
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Belgian coal (continued J 
The trouble was, in fact, that for 35 years, 
the coal industry was neglected and investment 
grossly inadequate. 
By 194:9 the industry was clearly antiquated, 
Accordingly, an $ 115,000,000 investment plan 
to raise the miner's individual output and make 
a better use of the coal extracted by 1956 was 
worked out. Since 1949 the number of pit shafts 
has dropped from 175 to 131, the ·number of 
companies from 83 to 55. . 
But the investment plan was drawn up in the 
national context; significantly, coal production, 
necessary for the export industries during the 
Korea boom, rose. So did prices. And the sight 
today of ultra-modern washeries and pitheads 
installations at mines which the experts fear 
are irremediably uneconomic is a tragic reminder 
of the cost of investing to maintain supplies 
at all costs - including the consumer's. 
The Schuman Plan 
Today, the Schuman Plan has changed the 
whole context of this history. Thus, under the 
terms of the Treaty, the High Authority, the 
executive of the Community, must ensure that 
in periods of shortage each industry has a fair 
access to the supplies that are available. Belgium 
can now depend on imports of coal, especially 
of Ruhr coal, without the fear that the stream 
will dry up as soon as a boom increases the 
demand for coal in the exporting countries 
themselves. 
COST OF LABOR TO EMPLOYERS 
(Wages and Social Security in belgian francs) 
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There is no longer any need for Belgium to 
maintain maximum production, no justification, 
therefore, for protecting her coal industry. Com-
petition based on price again becomes possible. 
Sure enough since the establishment of the com-
mon market in February 1953, German coking 
coal is entering Belgium at Us rate of 200,000 
tons a month against 25,000 tons before. Bel-
gium's industries, C'lnsuming coal, are finding 
their costs cheapened in consequence. 
But for the coal industry itself, and for the 
large areas of Belgium that depend on their 
prosperity, these changes bring great problems. 
They are so great that it was necessary to 
work out special provisions in the Community 
Treaty to see that there shoulq be no disruption 
of society and production. 
When the Schuman Plan was discussed in 
1950 and 1951 the Belgians viewed with dismay 
the disadvantages under which their industry 
laboured: the laudable handicap of the highest 
wages in the Community-to-be; many poor coal-
seams; antiquated equipment and a structure 
which many experts considered unfitted to cope 
with the new problems arising. 
In fact, living standards in all the countries 
around Belgium have been rising steadily to-
wards Belgian levels. This has partially eased 
Belgium's problem l>, 
But above all, the Treaty itseLf provided a 
revolutionary solution to the problem, made 
possible by the fact that in pooling their resources 
and delegating their sovereignty to common 
institutions the six nations assumed at once a 
corporate responsibility for the difficulties 
assailing any one of them. 
Thus, under the terms of the Treaty, the 
low-cost mines of the Community, in Germany 
and the Netherlands, financed half of a Commu-
nity equalisation fund run by the High Authority 
the object of which was to allow Belgium to 
sell her coal on the common market while she 
continued to modernise her mines. The other 
half of the fund was financed by the Belgian 
government. The system is to last only during 
a transition period of five years, or at the most, 
seven. The aim of the fund is thus not to protect 
Belgium's industry but to give it the incentive 
to lower costs and the opportunity to re equip to 
become competitive. 
1) German coal was 250 francs cheaper than Belgian in 1949 at 
the plt!Jead; now it is only 80 francs cheaper, 
Some mines however, will always be margi· 
nal. These are likely to be fewer than had 
been expected, for about half of Belgian pro-
duction is anthracite of which Europe is very 
short. 
An experts • commission has just published 
a report addressed to the Belgian government, . 
the companies and the High Authority examining 
the conditions under which they might survi.ve 
in the future. The report shows that it will 
be very difficult for two of the mines at least, 
producing about 1Yz million tons, to do so, Even 
further concentration of production and heavy 
investments may not make them profitable again. 
At the same time, the Community Treaty 
gives them a II$ans- also revolutionary in 
Europe· of solving the social problems raised 
by the conversion of the mines: resettlement, 
The resettlement provisions of the Treaty 
provide that the High Authority and the interest-
ed national government should together help 
labour laid off as a result of modernisation 
either by paying to re educate the workers in 
new skills or to install them in new areas where 
work awaits them, or even, if necessary, to 
create new jobs on the spot. The first resettle-
ment operation has already begun for instance 
in the coalmines of central France where volun-
teers are being offered considerable incentives 
to move to thtl higher wage areas of Lorraine 
in north-east France. This can help greatly 
to solve the problems of the mining areas of the 
Borinage. 
Yet the problems of resettlement, in what-
ever form they are to be solved, should not be 
underrated. Labour locally; as indeed in the 
whole of Europe, is extremely loth to move • . It 
is difficult to persuade workers that it is in 
their own ultimate interest that uneconomic 
plants should be closed. Unfortunately, few 
· alternative· industries to absorb redundant labour 
exist in the Borinage; their tendency has in 
any case been to move away from the area. 
Already small shopkeepers are feeling the pinch, 
although unemployment has been kept down, 
They say that old age pensioners and the large 
foreign labour force, which tends to send its 
money home, do not give much scope to local 
commerce. A number of shops display •to let• 
signs, and shopkeepers want to stop the number 
growing. It will at the best take a long time to 
adapt ~he area to its new future without hard-
ship for many. Whatever solutions are applied, 
they are bound to be slow. 
Nevertheless, events are moving fast for 
the coal industry of the Community. Competition 
on the common market is already showing that 
the mines of southern France and Belgium need 
to reduce their output and raise their efficiency. 
And beyond all these problems looms the pros· 
pect of greater and greater competition from 
fuel oil. The mines of the Borinage have not 
yet suffered by such competition, yet the pro-
duction of fuel oil in Belgium alone ha3 risen 
from 21SO,OOO tons in 194:9 to over 2% million 
tons in 191S3, 
By seeing that the six-nation area of the 
common market faces the problems and developes 
the opportunities these changes present as one 
unit, the Community can see that in this first 
field of supranational effort Europe progresses 
into the second half of the twentieth century 
as smoothly and · as rapidly as the most pro-
gressive powers in the world. 
1.2 
1. 1 
1.0 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
BELGIAN COAL IMPORTS 
(hundred thousand tons. ) 
' ~I ~i 
:;;j 
~i ~ . 
zl ~i 
Uo 
I 
I 
I 
i 
0.1 I 
'- I " Ill IV 
.'1 
1951 
.Imports From Con1muni ty countries 
I 11 Ill IV 
1?53 
D ln1ports from thi rd coun tri es ( E11c luding USA) 
0 Imports fr~ USA 
I 
7 
JEAN MONNET 
NOl TO. STAN.D FOR RE-.ELECTION 
AS HIGH AUTHORITY PRESIDENT · 
On November 9, the day after his 66th 
birtJ .. day, M. Jean Monnet told his colleagues on 
the Community's High Authority that he would 
not stand for re- election at the expiry of his 
Presidential office on Febr.uary 10 next year. 
. M . Monnet gave the following reasons for 
his decision to the press on November 11 : 
"It is to enable me to take part with complete 
freedom of action and speech in the construction 
of European Unity which must be concrete and 
real that I resume this freedom on F ehruary 10 
1955 at the expiry of the mandate with which 
I have beeri entrusted as President of the High 
Authority." . 
"That which is now well on the road to 
success in the field of coal and steel in the six 
member countries of the Community must be 
followed through to its ultimate objective : the 
united states of Europe." 
. "The institutions of the Coal and Steel 
Community so far, the only European institutions 
to which the national parliaments of our member 
countries have consented to transfer part of 
their sovereignty and which they have vested 
with powers of decision. They have be~n func-
tioning for the past two years, and the f1rst Eu-
ropean market is today a living reality in the 
Benelux countries, in France, Germany and 
I , Ita y. 
"Our countries have become too small for 
the world of today, in relation tomodern techni-
cal methods and in comparison with the United 
States and the Russia of today, and of the China 
and the India of tomorrow. •• 
"The Unity of the European peoples, gathe-
red together in the united states of Europe, is 
the means of raising their standard of living and 
of maintaining peace. It is the great hope and 
opportunity of our era. If we work, unremittingly 
and unceasingly, for this end, it will become the 
reality of tomorrow." 
· In a letter to the Foreign Ministers of each 
of the Community member- countries, M.Monnet 
explained he had made his decision public on 
November 9 in regard to the stability of institu-
tions and to give the governments of the six 
member- countries sufficient time to elect a new 
President. 
M.Monnet's announcement attracted consi-
derable attention in the British, American and 
European press. 
The Times said that "M.Monnet will now work 
all the more openly- because no longer as an 
official- for the ideal of a united states of Eu-
rope." 
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The New York Times said : "M.Monnet now 
believes that France is the key country. He had 
hoped that France would take the lead in a Eu-
ropean union, as she did in proposing the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community (which M. Men-
des- France voted for in the French National 
Assembly). He now sees France turning natio-
nalist in spite of strong sentiment for a union, 
and he wants to do what he can to strengthen 
and organise this sentiment befo e the nationa-
listic trend goes too far". 
According to the French paper "Le Monde• 
"the profound changes which have recently 
occurred in international politics will probably 
oblige M. Monnet, as they oblige us, to rethin,k 
the problem of the construction of Europe . 
Franc- Tireur said that "M. Monnet has always 
felt that the coal- steel pool, of which he was 
the promoter, was only a stage. He was one of 
those who saw in the E. D. C. a second stage, 
especially interesting because of its political 
ramifactions. 
"Rightly disappointed by the rejection of E.D.C., 
he will not resign himself to seeing the policy 
of European integration, which was his own 
policy, abandoned or even temporarily suspended, 
It is aoove all the political and economic unification 
of Europe which fascinate M.Monnet. It is to 
further their progress that he will devote his 
new freedom and his great imaginative powers". 
Photo New- York Times 
